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Abstract
We analyze a simple dynamic durable good oligopoly model where sellers are capacity constrained.
Two incumbent sellers and potential entrants choose their capacities at the start of the game. We
solve for equilibrium capacity choices and the (necessarily mixed) pricing strategies. In equilibrium,
the buyer splits the order with positive probability to preserve competition; thus it is possible that
a high and low price seller both have sales. Sellers command a rent above the value of unmet
demand by the other seller. A buyer would benet from either a commitment not to buy in the
future or by hiring an agent with instructions to buy always from the lowest priced seller.
JEL numbers: D4, L1
Keywords: Strategic buyers, capacity constraints, bilateral oligopoly, dynamic competition.
1 Introduction
In many durable goods markets, sellers who have market power and intertemporal capacity con-
straints face strategic buyers who make purchases over time. There may be a single buyer, as in
the case of a government that purchases military equipment or awards construction projects, such
as for bridges, roads, or airports, and chooses among the o¤ers of a few large available suppliers.
Or, there may be a small number of large buyers, as with companies that order aircraft or large
ships, where the supply could come only from a small number of large, specialized companies.1 The
capacity constraint may be due to the production technology: a construction company undertaking
to build a highway today may not have su¢ ciently many engineers or machines available to compete
for an additional large project tomorrow, given that the projects take a long time to complete; a
similar constraint is faced by an aircraft builder that accepts an order for a large number of aircraft.
Or, the capacity constraint may simply correspond to the ow of a resource that cannot exceed
some level: thus, if a supplier receives a large order today, he will be constrained on what he can
o¤er in the future. This e¤ect may be indirect, as when the resource is a necessary ingredient for
a nal product (often the case with pharmaceuticals). More generally, the above cases suggest a
need to study dynamic oligopolistic price competition for durable goods with capacity constraints
and strategic buyers.
In this paper, we show that the preservation of future competition provides an incentive for a
strategic buyer to split early purchase orders. We also demonstrate that the option to split orders
leaves a buyer worse o¤ in equilibrium. We illustrate these results with a simple dynamic model.
Two incumbent sellers choose capacities and a large number of potential entrants choose their
capacities after the incumbents. Capacity determines how much a rm can produce over the entire
game. Sellers then set rst-period prices, and the buyer decides how many units of the durable
good to purchase from each seller. In the second period, given the remaining capacity of each rm,
1In an empirical study of the defense market, Greer and Liao (1986, p. 1259) nd that the aerospace
industrys capacity utilization rate, which measures propensity to compete, has a signicant impact on the
variation of defense business protability and on the cost of acquiring major weapon systems under dual-
source competition. Ghemawat and McGahan (1998) show that order backlogs, that is, the inability of
manufacturers to supply products at the time the buyers want them, is important in the U.S. large turbine
generator industry and a¤ects rmsstrategic pricing decisions. Likewise, production may take signicant
time intervals in several industries: e.g., for large cruise ships, it can take three years to build a single ship
and an additional two years or more to produce another one of the same type. Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2003) estimate a dynamic procurement auction game for highway construction in California - they nd
that, due to contractorscapacity constraints, previously won uncompleted contracts reduce the probability
of winning further contracts.
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the sellers again set prices and the buyer makes a purchasing decision. Demand has a very simple
structure. The buyer has value for three units in total, with the rst two having a current and a
future utility while the third only has utility in the second period. This is the simplest structure
that allows for future demand and the possibility of order splitting in the rst period.
Our main results are as follows. First, entry is always blockaded - the incumbent sellers choose
capacities such that there is no protable entry. Second, given these capacity levels, a pure strategy
subgame perfect equilibrium in prices fails to exist. This is due to a combination of two phenomena.
On the one hand, a buyer has an incentive to split his order in the rst period if the prices are
close, in order to keep strong competition in the second period. This in turn creates an incentive for
sellers to raise their prices. On the other hand, if prices are too high,each seller has a unilateral
incentive to lower his price, and sell all of his capacity. We solve for the mixed strategy equilibrium
and show that it has two important properties. The buyer has a strict incentive to split the order
with positive probability: when the realized equilibrium prices do not di¤er too much, the buyer
chooses to buy in the rst period from both the high price seller and the low price seller. Further,
we show that the sellers make a positive economic rent above the prots of serving the buyers
residual demand, if the other seller sold all of his units.
Three implications then follow from the existence of positive economic rents for the sellers.
First, the buyer would like to commit to make no purchases in the second period, so as to induce
strong price competition in the rst period. That is, the buyer is hurt when competition takes
place over two periods rather than in one. This result implies that a buyer would prefer not to
negotiate frequently with sellers, placing new orders as their needs arise over time but, instead,
negotiate at one point in time a contract that covers all possible future needs.2 Second, a buyer
has the incentive to commit to myopic behavior. In other words, the buyer is hurt by his ability
to behave strategically over the two periods and would benet from a commitment to buy always
from the lowest priced rm.3 Finally, we note that the buyer has an incentive to vertically integrate
with one of the suppliers.
2For example, in 2002 EasyJet signed a contract with Airbus for 120 new A319 aircraft and also for the
option to buy, in addition, up to an equal number of such aircraft for (about) the same price. While the
agreed aircraft were being gradually delivered, in 2006 EasyJet exercised the option and placed an order for
an additional 20 units to account for projected growth, with delivery set between then and 2008. Similarly,
an order was placed in 2006 by GE Commercial Aviation to buy 30 Next Generation 737s from Boeing and
also to agree to an option for an additional 30 such aircraft.
3For example, many government procurement rules do not allow purchasing o¢ cers to exercise discretion.
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Our study of competition with a strategic buyer and two sellers who face dynamic (intertempo-
ral) capacity constraints is broadly related to two literatures. The rst is the literature on capacity-
constrained competition. Many of these papers identify the nonexistenceof a price equilibrium
(Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), Osborne and Pitchik (1986), Gehrig (1990), and others). Several
other papers have studied the choice of capacity in anticipation of oligopoly competition and the
e¤ects of capacity constraints on collusion; see, for example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Lamb-
son (1987), Allen, Deneckere, Faith, and Kovenock (2000), and Compte, Jenny and Rey (2002).
In this literature capacity constraints operate on a period-by-period basis. Dynamic capacity con-
straints, the focus of our paper, have received much less attention in the literature. Griesmer and
Shubik (1963) and Dudey (1992) study games where capacity-constrained duopolists face a nite
sequence of identical buyers with unit demands. Besanko and Doraszelski (2004) study a dynamic
capacity accumulation game with price competition. Ghemawat (1997, ch.2) and Ghemawat and
McGaham (1998) characterize mixed strategy equilibria in a two-period duopoly (with one seller
having initially half of the capacity of the other). Garcia, Reitzes, and Stacchetti (2001) exam-
ine hydro-electric plants that can use their capacity (water reservoir) or save it for use in a later
period. Bhaskar (2001) shows that, by acting strategically, a buyer can increase his net surplus
when sellers are capacity constrained. In his model, however, there is a single buyer who has unit
demand in each period for a perishable good, and so order splittingcannot be studied.4 Dudey
(2006) presents conditions such that a Bertrand outcome is consistent with capacities chosen by the
sellers before the buyers arrive. In the above mentioned papers, demand is modeled as static and
independent across periods. The key distinguishing feature of our work is that the buyer (and not
just the sellers) are strategic and the evolution of capacities across periods depends on the actions
of both sides of the market.
Second, our work is related to the procurement literature where both buyers and sellers are
strategic. Of particular relevance is the work that examines a buyer who inuences the degree of
competition among (potential) suppliers, as in the context of split awardsand dual-sourcing.
Anton and Yao (1989 and 1992) consider models where a buyer can buy either from one seller
or split his order and buy from two sellers, who have strictly convex cost functions. They nd
conditions under which a buyer will split his order and characterize seemingly collusive equilibria.
4The buyer can chose not to buy in a given period, thus receiving zero value in that period, but obtaining
future units at lower prices. The buyer in our model views the good as durable and may wish to split the
order, possibly buying from the more expensive supplier in the rst period. Our focus and set of results are,
thus, quite di¤erent.
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Inderst (2006) examines a model similar to the work of Anton and Yao but with multiple buyers.
He demonstrates that having multiple buyers increases the incentive to split their orders across
sellers. A mechanism approach to dual-sourcing is o¤ered by Riordan and Sappington (1987). We
depart from this literature in two important directions. First, the intertemporal links are at the
heart of our analysis: the key issue is how purchasing decisions today a¤ect the sellersremaining
capacities tomorrow. In contrast, the work mentioned above focuses on static issues and relies
on cost asymmetries. Second, strategic purchases from competing sellers and a single buyer in a
dynamic setting are also studied under learning curvee¤ects; see e.g. Cabral and Riordan (1994)
and Lewis and Yildirim (2002). In our case, by buying from one seller a buyer makes that seller
less competitive in the following period. In the learning curve case, that e¤ect is reversed, due to
unit cost decreases.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is set up in Section 2. In section
3 we derive the equilibrium and discuss a number of implications. We conclude in Section 4. Proofs
are relegated to an Appendix.
2 The model
The buyer and sellers interact over two periods. There are two incumbents and many potential
entrants on the seller side of the market. The product is perfectly homogeneous and perfectly
durable over the lifetime of the model. All players have a common discount factor :
The buyer values each of the rst two units at V in each period that he has the unit and a
third unit at V3 in only period 2. Thus, for each of the rst two units purchased in period 1, the
buyer gets consumption value V in each period. We assume that V  V3 > 0.5
At the start of the game the incumbent sellers simultaneously choose their capacities. The
potential entrants observe the incumbentscapacity choices and then simultaneously choose whether
to enter and their capacity choice if they enter. We assume that the cost of capacity for any seller
is small, ", but positive; throughout the paper, all prot levels are gross of the capacity costs. The
marginal cost of production is 0. The capacity choice is the maximum that the seller can produce
5The maximum discounted gross value that a buyer could obtain over both periods is equal to 2V (1 +
) + V3. Our specication is consistent with growing demand. Note that, in general, the rst and second
units could have di¤erent values (say V1  V2). Also, we could allow the demand of the third unit to be
random. It is straightforward to introduce either of these cases in the model, with no qualitatitive change
in the results, but at the cost of some additional notation.
4
over the two periods. Thus, each seller has capacity at the beginning of the second period equal
to initial capacity less the units sold in the rst period. In each period, each of the sellers sets a
per unit price for his available units of capacity. The buyer chooses how many units to purchase
from each seller at the price specied, as long as the seller has enough capacity. Provisionally, we
assume that the capacity choice at the start of the game for each incumbent seller is equal to 2 and
that entry is blockaded. Later, we demonstrate that when the third unit has signicant economic
value, these are the equilibrium capacity choices. We assume that sellers commit to their prices
one period at a time and that all information is common knowledge and symmetric. We solve for
subgame perfect equilibria of the game.
Let us now discuss why we have adopted this modelling strategy. We analyze a dynamic bilateral
oligopoly game, where all players are largeand are therefore expected to have market power. In
such cases, one wants the model to reect the possibility that each player can exercise some market
power. By allowing the sellers to make price o¤ers and the buyer to choose how many units to
accept from each seller, all players have market power in our model. It follows that quantities and
prices evolve from the rst period to the second jointly determined by the strategies adopted by
the buyer and the sellers. If, instead, we allowed the buyer to make price o¤ers, then the buyer
would have all the market power and the price would be zero.6 In fact, anticipating such a scenario,
sellers would not be willing to pay even an innitesimal entry cost and, thus, such a market would
never open. There are further advantages of this modeling strategy. First, with sellers making
o¤ers, our results are more easily comparable with other papers in the literature. Further, there
may be agency (moral hazard) considerations that contribute to why in practice we typically see
the sellers making o¤ers.7
The interpretation of the timing of the game is immediate in case the sellerssupply comes from
an existing stock (either units that have been produced at an earlier time, or some natural resource
6Inderst (2006) demonstrates that giving multiple buyers the right to make o¤ers that has a signicant
impact on results due to the convexity of the sellerscost functions. In our model of constant marginal costs,
where a seller has capacity in place, the buyer will always buy a unit at a price of 0 if the buyer can make
o¤ers.
7In general we see the sellers making o¤ers, even with a single buyer, as when the Department of Defense
(DOD) is purchasing weapon systems. The DOD may do this to solve possible agency problems between
the agent running the procurement auction and the DOD. If an agent can propose o¤ers, it is much easier
for sellers to bribe the agent to make high o¤ers than if sellers make o¤ers, which can be observed by the
regulator. This is because the sellers can bribe the agent to make high o¤ers to each of them, but competition
between the sellers would give each seller an incentive to submit a low bid to make all the sales and it would
be quite di¢ cult for the agent to accept one o¤er that was much higher than another.
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period 2  begins
Figure 1: Timing
that the rm controls). One simple way to understand the timing in the case where production
takes place in every period is illustrated in Figure 1. The idea here is that actual production takes
time. Thus, orders placed in period 1 are not completed before period two orders arrive. Since
each seller has the capacity to work only on a limited number of units at a time, units ordered
in period one restrict how many units could be ordered in period two. In such a case, since our
interpretation involves delivery after the current period, the buyers values specied in the game
should be understood as the present values for these future deliveries (and the interpretation of
discounting should also be accordingly adjusted).
3 Equilibrium
We are constructing a subgame perfect equilibrium and, thus, we work backwards from period 2.
After nding the period 2 subgame outcomes, we derive buyer demand and nd the equilibrium
pricing strategies for period 1. Next, we identify possible buyer actions to modify the competition
and limit seller rents. Finally, we examine equilibrium capacity choices by sellers.
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3.1 Second period
There are several cases to consider, depending on how many units the buyer purchased from each
seller in period 1. Let B denote the remaining units of buyer demand, and let Ci denote a seller
with i units of remaining capacity. If the buyer purchased 3 units in period 1, the game is over as
there is no remaining demand in period 2. The substantive subgame cases are:
Buyer purchased two units in period 1 . If the buyer bought a unit from each of the sellers in
period 1, then the price in period 2 is 0 due to Bertrand competition; each of the C1 sellers earns
a prot of 0. If the buyer purchased 2 units from the same rm, then the other rm becomes a
monopolist in period 2 and charges V3; the period 2 equilibrium prot of the C2 seller is V3 and, of
course, the C0 seller earns 0.
Buyer purchased one unit in period 1 . In this case, the buyer has demand for B = 2 units, and
there is one C2 seller and one C1 seller. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in this case. There
exists a mixed strategy equilibrium in which seller C2s prot is V3 and seller C1s prot is V3=2,
the support of the prices is from V3=2 to V3, and the price distributions are F1(p) = 2  V3p for seller
C1, and F2(p) = 1  V32p for p < V3 with a mass point of
1
2 at p = V3 for seller C2.
Buyer purchased no units in period 1 . Each seller enters period 2 with 2 units of capacity,
while the buyer has demand for 3 units. Again, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. In the
mixed strategy equilibrium, each sellers prot is V3, the price support is from V3=2 to V3, and the
distribution is F (p) = 2  V3p for each seller.
Period 2 outcomes highlight two key insights that run throughout the paper (please see the
Appendix for verication of equilibrium in the subgames). The rst concerns the calculation of the
equilibrium sellersprots and the second regards the ranking of the sellersprice distributions. Let
CL and CH , where L  H, denote the low and high capacity seller, respectively. If CL < B, then
seller CH can guarantee himself a payo¤ of at least V3(B   CL) since, no matter what the other
seller does, he can always charge V3 and sell at least B   CL units. This is seller CHs security
prot level. This is because seller CL can supply only up to CL of the B units of buyer demand,
and the buyer is willing to pay at least V3. Seller CHs security prot puts a lower bound on the
price o¤ered in period 2. Given seller CH can sell at most B units (that is, the total demand), he
will never charge a price below V3(B  CL)=B, since a lower price would lead to a payo¤ less than
his security prot. Since seller CH would never charge a price below V3(B  CL)=B; this level also
puts a lower bound on the price seller CL would charge and, as that seller has CL units he could
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possibly sell, his security prot is CL
V3(B CL)
B .
8 Competition between the two sellers xes their
prots at their respective security levels.
The second insight deals with the incentives for aggressive pricing. We nd that the seller CH
will price less aggressively than seller CL in period 2. Seller CH knows that he will make sales even if
he is the highest price seller, while seller CL makes no sales if he is the highest price seller. So, seller
CL always has an incentive to price more aggressively. More precisely, the FH price distribution
rst-order stochastically dominates FL. This general property has important implications for the
quantities sold and the market shares over the entire game.
The equilibrium payo¤s in the second period subgames are summarized in Table 1:
Table 1: Period 2 incremental payo¤s for (2; 2) capacity game
Period 2 (B;H;L) conguration Buyer Payo¤ Seller CH payo¤ Seller CL payo¤
(3; 2; 2) 2V   V3 V3 V3
(2; 2; 1) V   V3=2 V3 V3=2
(1; 2; 0) 0 V3 0
(1; 1; 1) V3 0 0
:
3.2 First period
We use Figure 2 to summarize the buyers purchasing behavior in period 1. In response to any
pair of prices, the buyer maximizes net surplus, including period 2 consequences, by choosing how
many units to purchase from each seller. The four regions in Figure 2 correspond to the buyers
optimal choice. First, in the no purchase region, both prices are su¢ ciently high that the buyer
optimally waits until period 2 for a payo¤ of [2V + V3   2V3], from Table 1. Dening   V3
as the discounted value of unit 3, this buyer payo¤ becomes 2V  . To see that this dominates
buying 1 or 2 units in period 1, suppose that p1 is the lower of the two prices. Employing Table 1,
we see that splitting has a buyer payo¤ of 2V (1 + ) +  p1   p2, and the comparison reduces to
2(V +) < p1+p2, which corresponds to the line segment between the no purchase and split regions.
Similarly, waiting dominates buying 2 units from the lower price seller when the low price is above
V +=2, represented by the vertical (and horizontal) line segments dividing the no purchase and
8Note that while C V3(B C)B is not strictly speaking the security prot of the low-capacity seller, it
becomes that after one round of elimination of strictly dominated strategies. More generally, for demand
values V1  V2  :::  VB , seller CH has the monopoly option on the residual demand curve and the security
prot level is maxfVB(B   CL); VB 1(B   CL   1); :::; VB CL+1(1)g. This distinction does not matter for
subgames of the initial (2; 2) capacity conguration but it does arise for other conguration cases; see the
Appendix for details on these other cases.
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Figure 2: Period 1 demand for (2,2) capacity
monopoly regions. Thus, whenever p1 is to the left of the line segment, the buyer will purchase 2
units, and the comparison is then between monopoly for seller 1 and splitting. The buyer will prefer
to split whenever the price di¤erence is less than , the buyers savings from Bertrand competition
following a split. Finally, note that indi¤erence holds for prices on the boundary lines.9
There is no pure strategy equilibrium in period 1 with this demand structure, a common feature
of games with capacity constraints. There is clearly no pure strategy equilibrium with no buyer
purchases in period 1. Such a demand outcome requires high prices and either seller can protably
undercut and sell 2 units. For example, even at p1 = p2 = V +, the lowest prices where the buyer
would choose to make no purchase, a price cut to any p̂ < V will induce the buyer to purchase 2
units from the deviating seller and, with p̂ close to V , this will increase his payo¤ from  to 2p̂.
As the demand structure in Figure 2 illustrates, it is easy to rule out candidate equilibria where
the buyer only purchases 1 unit. The substantive case is where the buyer purchases 2 units. The
buyers incentive is to split when prices are within  of each other. But, if prices are within 
of each other then each seller is able to raise his price slightly and still sell a unit. Thus, prices
9Purchasing more than 2 units is dominated. If both prices are positive, buying 2 units via a split strictly
dominates buying 3, since the ensuing Bertrand competition yields a price of 0 for the 3rd unit in period 2.
When pi = 0 and pj > , purchasing 2 units from i is optimal and strictly dominates purchasing 3 units.
If 0  pj  , splitting and buying 3 units are both optimal choices. Of course, buying 3 units always
dominates buying more than 3 units since there is no value for a fourth unit. Finally, on the monopoly-no
purchase boundary, the buyer is also indi¤erent between buying 1 unit. In all other cases, buying 1 unit is
not optimal.
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must be at least  apart. If the gap is greater than , then the buyer will buy both units from
the low price seller. In this case, however, the low price seller can raise his price and still sell two
units. The only remaining possibility is a price di¤erence equal to . The buyer will either buy two
units from the low price seller, split his order, or mix between the two options. No matter how the
buyers indi¤erence is resolved, there is always a protable deviation for at least one seller. Thus,
Lemma 1. There is no pure strategy equilibrium in the monopsony model.
Now, we present our results on equilibrium for period 1.
Proposition 1. There exists a mixed strategy equilibrium for period 1 in which the outcome
is e¢ cient: the buyer purchases 2 units with probability 1. The distribution of prices is symmetric
and given by










1  (  )=p for p  p  p+






 and p = p+ 2
ii) For   ,
F (p) =
8>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>:
1  p=p for p  p  p 
1 =p for p   p  p+
2  (p+)=(p ) for p+  p < p
1 for p = p
where p =
p
V and p = V +:
iii) Equilibrium payo¤s are  = p+ for each seller and 2V (1 + )  2p  for the buyer.
Several fundamental economic properties hold in the equilibrium across the full parameter range
for , the value for the third unit. First, the equilibrium is e¢ cient because 2 units are purchased
for any realized prices. Since p  V + , it must be that p1 + p2 does not exceed the threshold
of 2(V + ) for purchasing 2 units. Second, the expected seller payo¤ is always p + . This is
an important property of the equilibrium incentive structure. By charging p + , the seller is
guaranteed a sale of exactly one unit. By construction, no price will undercut by more than , and
there is no chance of not making a sale. At the same time, the rival seller never charges  more
than p+, so there is no chance of a monopoly outcome at p+. This is reected by the spread
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of the price support, p p, which never exceeds 2. Thus, with a sale guaranteed, prot is at least
p+. Can prot be any larger? If so, then the price distribution is at within a neighborhood of
p+. As a result, the price p is strictly dominated, since there is no change in sales for a small price
increase implying that the price distribution is also at in a neighborhood of p, which contradicts
the denition of p. Thus, seller prot is p+. The price distribution is then constructed so that
every price has an expected payo¤ of p+.
Proposition 1 allows us to assess the impact of dynamic price competition on the buyer and
seller sides of the market. The static price competition benchmark, where all purchases must occur
in period 1, has the same price outcome as the period 2 subgame following no purchases in period
1. Thus, the outcome is e¢ cient, static expected prots are , and the buyer expected surplus
is 2V (1 + )   . Comparing this outcome to that for dynamic price competition, we see that
the buyer su¤ers while the sellers gain. In the dynamic game, the outcome is e¢ cient and social
surplus is unchanged from the static game. At p+, however, seller prots are strictly higher in
the dynamic game. By this measure, competition is less intense in the dynamic game. Intuitively,
a buyer splits purchases in the dynamic game even though this increases current expenditures more
than buying 2 units from the lowest priced seller. The value to the buyer is the preservation of
competition for period 2. The less intense price competition in the dynamic game is associated not
only with higher prots, but also with non-overlapping price supports as p in the dynamic game is
strictly above , the upper limit of the price support in the static game. With an e¢ cient outcome,
but higher seller prots, the expected net surplus of the buyer is necessarily lower in the dynamic
game. Thus,
Proposition 2. In equilibrium, the expected prot of each seller is greater than , the prot
level in the static game. In an e¢ cient equilibrium, the buyers expected payments in the dynamic
game are greater those in the static game.
While the economic structure in terms of e¢ ciency, payo¤s relative to the support, and dynamic
versus static comparisons do not vary with the value of the buyer units,  and V , the quantitative
dimensions of the equilibrium price distribution do. The required changes in the distribution
commence when  crosses a threshold relative to V . For  below the threshold, no part of the
equilibrium depends on V . The price spread (p p) is always 2 and equilibrium prices are strictly
below the no purchase demand region (V + ). The distribution F is continuous and atomless,
but it has a kink at p + . See Figure 3 for details. For  above the threshold, the equilibrium
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Case: ∆ > ∆*
Figure 4: Equilibrium when  is large
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Furthermore, the price distribution rises smoothly at low prices, has a gap, then rises smoothly
again, and then has an atom at p = V +. When  is large, the form of the distribution for low
 creates a protable deviation to prices just below p. To maintain incentives, it is necessary to
compress the price spread from 2. But this implies that p    is now below p + , and prices
between these values are strictly dominated since demand is always in the split region for any price
o¤ered by the other rm (see Figure 4). As a result, the distribution has a gap in this region. In
turn, an atom is required at p in order for the highest price before the gap, p   , to yield the
equilibrium prot p+. Intuitively, the missing massfrom the gap is redistributed as an atom
at p so that low prices yield a su¢ ciently high probability of a monopoly outcome.10
3.3 Possible actions by the buyer to reduce sellersrents
As we saw above (Proposition 2), in the equilibrium each sellers prot exceeds : This is an
important property and we now discuss some of its implications. We illustrate three strategies that
the buyer can use to reduce his expected payments and still preserve e¢ ciency. First, the buyer
benets if he can commit to make all his purchases at once, e¤ectively collapsing the game into
a one-shot interaction. Second, we show that the buyer has an incentive to commit to (myopic)
period-by-period optimization. Third, we demonstrate that the buyer will benet by acquiring one
of the sellers.
These three observations help to demonstrate the fundamental force underlying the equilibrium:
due to strategic considerations, the buyer does not always purchase from the lowest price seller when
he plans to make further purchases, giving sellers the incentive to raise their prices above the static
equilibrium level. As the buyer is hurtby acting strategically across the two periods of the game,
we show that there are actions he can take (e.g. through some unilateral policy commitments) to
e¤ectively change the game. In cases when such actions are possible, we thus identify reasons why
the buyer would like to choose them. Our rst observation is:
Corollary 1 The buyer would benet from a commitment not to purchase any units in period 2.
The equilibrium seller prot level described in Proposition 2 is larger than in the static equi-
10We have assumed 0 <  < V . In the limit, as ! 0, the mixed strategy equilibrium converges to pure
Bertrand competition for 2 units of demand (both prices are 0). As  ! V , the distribution collapes to
p = p = 2V . Furthermore, for  above a threshold  > , we are able to construct ine¢ cient equilibria,
where the demand outcome is either a split or no purchase. Seller payo¤s are less than the prots for the
equilibrium in Proposition 1, but above the static benchmark; see Appendix for details.
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librium (when the buyer commits to buying all goods in period 1). Recall that the static outcome
coincides with the period 2 equilibrium following no sales in period 1, where each seller earns V3
and the buyer purchases 3 units. Viewed as a static game, this becomes an e¢ cient outcome (no
discounting). Thus, both outcomes are e¢ cient but the static game has lower seller prots and
hence a larger residual of the social surplus remains for the buyer.
The behavior described in Corollary 1 would require, of course, some vehicle of commitment
that would make future purchases not possible. This is an interesting result and can be viewed
as consistent with the practice of airliners placing a large order that often involves the option to
purchase some aircraft in the future at the same price for rm orders placed now. Such behavior is
sometimes attributed to economies of scale our analysis shows that such behavior may emerge for
reasons purely having to do with how sellers compete with one another. Our second observation is:
Corollary 2 The buyer would benet from a commitment to myopic behavior under which pur-
chases are made on the basis of static optimization (in each period).
Suppose that the buyer could commit to myopic behavior. That is, for period 1 purchases, the
buyer only values the current units (2 units, each valued at V (1+ )). Of course, period 2 purchase
decisions are unchanged. As a result, a myopic buyer ignores the strategic link between the periods.
Further, in period 1 a myopic buyer will always purchases units from the lowest priced seller (as
long as this price is below V (1 + )). There are two possible ways to generate a pure strategy
equilibrium with a myopic buyer. First, in equilibrium each seller charges =2 in the rst period
and the buyer purchases two units from one seller. Then, the other seller charges a price of V3 in
the second period and the buyer purchases one unit. Thus, the buyer pays a total of 2. To see
that this is an equilibrium, rst observe that the buyer indeed behaves optimally, on a period by
period basis. Furthermore, neither seller has a protable deviation. In period 1, if a seller lowers
his price below =2, he then sells both units but obtains a lower prot. If he raises his price, he
sells no units in the rst period but obtains a prot equal to V3 in the second.
There is, however, the possibility that the buyer may split his order (given myopia, the buyer
is indi¤erent between splitting or not) may be viewed as a weakness of the equilibrium described
just above. This can be easily addressed in the second possible way to establish an equilibrium, if
we introduce a smallest unit of account,  . The equilibrium has one seller charging =2    and
the other seller charging =2 in the rst period and the buyer buying two units from the low price
seller. The seller that made no sales in the rst period, charges V3 in the second period and the
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buyer purchases one unit from that seller. Thus, total payment in present value terms for the buyer
is 2  2 . Clearly, the equilibrium payo¤s are essentially the same under both approaches.
The underlying intuition for Corollary 2 is that a seller knows that if he sets a higher price than
his rival he cannot sell a unit in period one (and can only obtain a second period prot of V3). The
above comparison may provide a rationale for policies of large buyers that require purchasing in
each situation strictly from the lowest price seller. In particular, a government may often assume
the role of such a large buyer. It is often observed that, even when faced with scenarios like
the one examined here, governments require that purchasing agents buy only from the low-price
supplier, with no attention paid to the future implications of these purchasing decisions. While
there may be other reasons for such a commitment policy (such as preventing corruption and
bribes for government agents), our analysis suggests that by tying its handsand committing to
purchase from the seller that sets the lowest current price, the government manages to obtain a
lower purchasing cost across the entire purchasing horizon. We nd, in other words, that delegation
to a myopic purchasing agent is benecial: it intensies competition among sellers.
Suppose that a buyer can acquire a seller after he has chosen his capacity. A further implication
of Proposition 2 is:
Corollary 3 The buyer has a strict incentive to acquire one of the sellers, that is, to become
vertically integrated.
This result is based on the following calculations. By vertically integrating, and paying the
equilibrium prot of a seller when there is no integration, ; the total price that the buyer will pay
is  + since the other seller would charge the monopoly price V3 for a third unit (sold in period
2). This total payment is strictly less than the total expected payment (2) that the buyer would
otherwise make in equilibrium. Thus, even though the other seller will be a monopolist, the buyers
payments are lower, since the seller that has not participated in the vertical integration has lower
prots.11
11In our analysis, sellers use linear prices. It should not be too surprising that the application of nonlinear
pricing would lead to di¤erent results. This case would be relevant when a seller can price the sale of one
unit separately from the sale of two units. In an earlier working paper, Biglaiser and Vettas (2004) shows
that with a monopsonist under nonlinear pricing, there are unique pure strategy equilibrium payo¤s with
each seller making prot equal to . In period 1, both sellers charge  for both a single unit and two units
and the buyer buys either two or three units. The ability of each seller to price each of his units separately
changes the strategic incentives, intensies price competition and allows us to derive an equilibrium where
the sellers make no positive rents.
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3.4 Initial capacity choices by sellers
Thus far, we have conducted the analysis assuming exogenous capacity levels, where each seller has
2 units. Now, suppose that their capacity choices are endogenous and other rms are free to enter.
We claim that when the discounted value of the third unit, , is signicant relative to the other
units, then there is an equilibrium in which each rm acquires 2 units of capacity. The endogenous
capacity game is the following:
 Incumbents simultaneously choose their capacities
 Entrants observe incumbent capacity choices and simultaneously choose their capacities
 Firms that have positive capacity levels follow the timing as depicted in Figure 1
Assume that the cost of capacity is " per unit and focus on the limiting case of "! 0. We then
have the following proposition.
Proposition 3. If   V=2, then the capacity game has an equilibrium where each incumbent
chooses 2 units of capacity and there is no entry.
To understand the basic forces at work, consider rst whether entry is protable when the
incumbents each have two units of capacity. As shown in Proposition 1, each incumbent makes
a positive prot in a (2; 2) capacity conguration. Entry, however, always results in Bertrand
competition where no rm makes positive prots. The smallest entry event is the (2; 2; 1) capacity
outcome, where one entrant has one unit of capacity. Even then, the market collapses to Bertrand
competition. Furthermore, any period 2 subgame yields 0 prots for all sellers, since there is either
an excluded seller or a seller with excess capacity. Given this, equilibrium requires that all rms
choose a price of 0 in period 1. Thus, entry is not protable.
In view of the positive prots of incumbents, consider whether incumbent capacity expansion
is protable. Recall that in a (2; 2) capacity setting, each rm can guarantee  in prots because
the other incumbent cannot supply the entire buyer demand. When the conguration is (3; 2), this
logic breaks down and the C2 rm is more aggressive in period 1. In equilibrium, the buyer will
purchase 2 units from the C3 seller in period 1 more often than in (2; 2). In particular, if the C3
seller has a lower price than the C2 seller in period 1, then the buyer will always buy 2 units from
the lower priced seller: this preserves Bertrand competition in period 2 and there is no need for
the buyer to split the order and pay a premium to include the higher price rm in the split. This
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makes the C2 seller price more aggressively and lowers the prots of the C3 seller. In the mixed
strategy equilibrium for (3; 2), while the price supports intervals overlap, the price distribution of
C3 rst order stochastically dominates that for C2: In equilibrium, the C3 seller has a strictly lower
payo¤ than a C2 seller in (2; 2). Thus, capacity expansion is never protable.
With respect to a capacity reduction, from (2; 2) to (2; 1), the prot assessment is more subtle.
When the value of the third unit is signicant,   V=2, then the capacity reduction leads to lower
prots for the C1 rm. On the other hand, as  ! 0, the (2; 2) capacity equilibrium converges
to pure Bertrand competition, while in (2; 1) both rms make strictly positive prots. The reason
is that in the (2; 1) conguration the C2 seller will never price below V (1 + )=2, a lower bound
that does not depend on the value of the third unit. This is a consequence of buyer demand in
period 1: as long as C2 sets a price below V (1 + ), the buyer will purchase at least one unit from
C2. Depending on the price from C1, the C2 seller might also sell a second unit in the rst period
but, since C1 only has 1 unit of capacity, C2 is guaranteed a prot of at least  on its second unit.
Hence, C2 can guarantee a payo¤ of at least V (1 + ) + and, with 2 units of capacity, will never
price below 1=2 of V (1 + ) +: Given this, the C1 seller can price at 1=2 of V (1 + ) + and be
assured of a sale and hence a prot that remains positive even as  ! 0. Thus, as a measure of
competitive pressure, it is V rather than  that matters in (2; 1) when the third unit is of vanishing
value.
In contrast, it is  rather than V that functions as the marginal value with respect to
competitive pressure when the conguration is (2; 2) when  > V=2. From Proposition 1, the
rate of prot growth in  is greater than 1. As a result, the prot di¤erence between (2; 2) and
(2; 1) for the C1 seller rises with . As  crosses , this di¤erence is su¢ ciently large that it
dominates the security prot component of V (1 + )=2 for the C1 seller in the (2; 1) conguration.
Intuitively, additional capacity is valuable for the C1 seller when the marginal value of the third
unit is large. Thus, a (2; 2) conguration is neiher susceptible to capacity deviations by incumbents
nor attractive to entrants.
4 Conclusion
Capacity constraints play an important role in oligopolistic competition. In this paper, we have
examined markets where both sellers and the buyer act strategically. Sellers have intertemporal
capacity constraints, as well as the power to set prices. The buyer decides which sellers to buy
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from, taking into consideration that current purchasing decisions a¤ect the intensity of competition
in the future. Capacity constraints imply that a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. Instead,
sellers play a mixed strategy with respect to their pricing, and the buyer may split the order.
Importantly, we nd that the sellers enjoy higher prots than they would have in an one-shot
interaction (or, equivalently, the competitive prot from satisfying residual demand). The buyer is
hurt, in equilibrium, by the ability to behave strategically over the two periods, since this behavior
allows the sellers to increase their prices above their rivals and still sell their products. Thus, the
buyer has a strict incentive to commit not to buy in the future, or to commit to myopic, period-by-
period maximization (perhaps by delegating purchasing decisions to agents), as well as to vertically
integrate with one of the sellers.
This is, to our knowledge, one of the rst papers to consider capacity constraints and strategic
buyer behavior in a dynamic setting. In an earlier working paper, Biglaiser and Vettas (2004),
examined the model when there were multiple buyers and allowed non-linear pricing. When there
are multiple buyers and linear pricing, they found that the sellers were able to capture rents above
the value of the marginal unit . The idea is that if each of N buyers purchased 2 units in
period 1, and the sellers had equal remaining capacity (N of the original 2N units), then Bertrand
competition would ensue in period 2. This outcome involves both implicit coordination by buyers
in period 1 and aggregate order splitting. With non-linear pricing, they found in the monopsony
case that the sellerspayo¤s were held to the value of the marginal unit (); interestingly, they
found that the sellers still retain rents in the duopsony case.
With regard to future work, it would be interesting to consider the case where the products of-
fered by the two sellers are di¤erentiated. Is there a distortion because buyers strategically purchase
products di¤erent from their most preferred ones, with the purpose of intensifying competition in
the future? Another direction to consider is an alternative price determination formulation. For
instance, sellers may be able to make their prices dependent on the buyerspurchasing behavior
e.g. by o¤ering a lower price to a buyer that has not purchased in the past: loyalty discountand
other quantity based price discrimination mechanisms.
Appendix
Period 2 subgames for (2,2) capacity. We verify the claims in the text for equilibria in
the period 2 subgames. Case (a): The buyer purchased 2 units. There are two subgames. If
(B;CH ; CL) = (1; 2; 0), then the unique outcome is pH = V3 and the buyer purchases 1 unit from
seller CH . If (B;CH ; CL) = (1; 1; 1), then the unique outcome is that both sellers charge 0, and the
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buyer purchases one unit (due to standard Bertrand analysis). Case (b): buyer purchased 1 unit.
The subgame is (B;CH ; CL) = (2; 2; 1). Demand is more subtle than in case (a), since the buyer
may purchase up to 2 units. Figure 5A shows the demand outcome for any pair of prices. We
need to show that the price distributions specied in the text form a mixed strategy equilibrium.
By construction, any price in the support yields a payo¤ of V3 for seller C2 and V3=2 for seller C1.
Consider seller C2. At any price p < V3=2, the buyer purchases 2 units from C2 and the payo¤ is
2p which is less than V3. At any price p > V3, the buyer purchases 1 unit from seller C1. Thus,
C2 has a payo¤ of 0. Analogous arguments hold for seller C1. Thus, it is optimal for each seller to
price according to the specied distributions. Case (c): buyer made no purchases. The subgame is
symmetric and (B;CH ; CL) = (3; 2; 2). The buyer may now purchase up to 3 units and Figure 5B
shows the demand outcome across prices. By construction, any price in the support yields a payo¤
of V3 for each seller. If a seller o¤ers a price p < V3=2, then the buyer purchases 2 units from that
seller and the payo¤ is 2p which is less than V3. At any price p > V3, the buyer purchases 2 units
from the other seller, but no units at price p. Thus, the deviating seller has a payo¤ of 0. Thus, it
is optimal for each seller to price according to the specied distribution.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that we have an equilibrium at some (pL; pH).
Without loss of generality, we label prices so that pL  pH and refer to payo¤s L and H for
the L (low) and H (high) seller, respectively. First, observe that any price above V + 3=2 leads
to a payo¤ of . This is because, by demand in Figure 2, there are no period 1 sales for this
seller and, by Table 1, the period 2 payo¤ is V3. This implies that any price below =2 is strictly
dominated since, with a capacity of 2 units, the payo¤ at such a price is less than . Next, consider
pL > V +. With pH  pL, we are in the No Purchases region for demand and we have L = .
But then L can protably deviate to a price p where  < p < V + and be assured of selling at
least 1 unit for a payo¤ greater than .
This leaves candidate equilibria where =2  pL  V + . Referring to demand in Figure 2,
we see that (pL; pH) cannot be interior to any of the three demand regions (above the 45 line).
In either of the Monopoly (for L) or the Split regions, a slight increase in pL would leave demand
unchanged while resulting in a larger payo¤ for L. In the No Purchases region, we know from above
that L =  and, by pL  V + , that pH  V +  holds for (pL; pH) in this region. Then, we
see that any price p < pH   implies that the demand outcome at (p; pH) is Monopoly for L and
a payo¤ of 2p. But 2(pH  )  2V > , so L has a protable deviation.
The remaining possibility is that (pL; pH) lies on one of the three boundary lines (above the 45
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line) in Figure 2. The rst case is the vertical line segment of pL = V +=2 and pH  V + 3=2
along which the buyer is indi¤erent between No Purchase, 1 unit from L, and 2 units from L. If the
buyer chooses No Purchases, then L has a payo¤ of ; at a purchase of 1 unit, L has a payo¤ of pL.
Since any price p < pL implies 2 units for L and a payo¤ of 2p, it must be that the buyer chooses 2
units from L with probability 1 in response to (pL; pH) since any other buyer choice would leave L
with a protable deviation. This implies that H = . But then H can protably deviate to any
price p where V +=2 < p < V + 3=2 as this guarantees a sale of 1 unit and a payo¤ of at least
V +=2 > . Thus, there is no equilibrium in this case.
The second case is the boundary between the Split and No Purchases, pH = 2(V + )   pL
for V +=2  pL  V +. Note that L can guarantee a monopoly outcome by deviating to any
p < pH  . Since
2(pH  ) = 2(2V +  pL) > L = pL , 4V + 2 > 3pL
on this boundary, we see from pL  V + that the last inequality above is guaranteed by V > .
Thus, L has a protable deviation.
The last case is the Split and Monopoly boundary, pH = pL +  for =2  pL  V + =2,
where the buyer is indi¤erent between the two choices. As in the rst case, L can guarantee a sale
of 2 units by o¤ering a lower price, although in this case any p < pL will su¢ ce. Since this yields a
payo¤ of 2p, it must be that the buyer chooses Monopoly for L with probability one. This implies
H = . But H can guarantee a sale of 1 unit by o¤ering any p < pL +. Thus the lower bound
of =2  pL implies that H has a protable deviation and there is no equilibrium in this case.
Proof of Proposition 1. For the distributions specied in the text, we need only verify
that prices within the supports are optimal, while deviations to prices outside the supports are
unprotable. The undiscounted period 2 subgame payo¤s are in the text in Table 1. From that
table, we compare payo¤s across the feasible set of buyer period 1 choices and arrive at the demand
pattern in Figure 2 in the text. We then construct the prot function by calculating demand at
pairs of prices, and take expectations over the rivals price using the distribution specied in the
proposition. First, we examine the case when  < . Calculating the prot function, we nd
that for p  p
(p) =
8<:
2p for p  p 
p [2  F (p+)] for p   p  p+
p  (p )F (p ) for p+  p  p
At prices above the equilibrium support, two cases arise depending on the buyers demand
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p  (p )F (p ) for p  p  p+
 for p+  p










+ p [F (2(V +)  p)  F (p )] for p  p  p+
 for p+  p :
For each p, we substitute for the F term as dictated by the distribution specied in the propo-
sition. For any price in the support we readily verify that (p) = p+  . For prices below the
support, (p) is increasing and continuous in p with the limiting value of  as p " p. For prices
above the support, in each of the two cases, (p) is initially decreasing and continuous in p before
collapsing to  at prices above p +  . In each case, the limiting value is  as p # p. Thus, the
equilibrium is conrmed as all prices in the support yield  while all prices outside the support are
suboptimal.
Second, we examine the remaining case of  > . Calculating the prot function, we nd
(p) =
8>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>:
p [2  F (p+)] for p   p  p  2
p(2  F (p)) for p  2  p  p 
p for p  < p  p+
p  (p )F (p ) for p+ < p  p
+ (p ) [F (2p  p)  F (p )] for p < p  p+=2
 for p+=2 < p
As before, we substitute for the F distribution specied in the proposition. Verication of the
equilibrium then involves a straightforward, but lengthy comparison of payo¤s.
Finally, the e¢ ciency property and payo¤ outcomes were demonstrated in the text. 
Ine¢ cient equilibria for large  in the (2; 2) capacity conguration. For  su¢ ciently
large, there is a set of ine¢ cient equilibria. Suppose  > 4V (3  2
p
2) u :69V . Then the following




, where p = 2(V +) p and p 2 (G(); 2),
where G() = (V  =4)2 =V +, is an equilibrium. The support is a square that is centered on
the point (V +; V +) and always less than  in width. Referring back to Figure 2 on demand,
we see that the buyer either buys a unit from each seller or buys no units in period 1. Thus, the
equilibrium is ine¢ cient. A sellers payo¤, p, is bounded above by 2 which, in turn, is at least
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p
V less than a sellers payo¤ in the e¢ cient equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3. First, we show that (2; 2) is not susceptible to entry. Consider a
(2; 2; 1) conguration. In any period 2 subgame every seller has a payo¤ of 0. This is because every
pattern of period 2 demand purchases results in either an excluded seller or a seller with excess
capacity, so that Bertrand logic applies in the subgames. This implies that every seller has a payo¤
of 0 in the overall game. Suppose 3 units are purchased in period 1. Since the buyer has the option
of not buying a 3rd unit in period 1 and instead acquiring that unit next period for a price of 0,
the buyer will not pay a positive price on each unit purchased. Thus, some seller o¤ers a price of
0 and makes a sale. If this is seller C1 we are done. If it is one of the C2 sellers, then the above
argument (for a 3rd unit) holds and the buyer will never pay a positive price. Now suppose 2 units
are purchased in period 1. Therefore, some seller has no sales in period 1 and has 0 payo¤ overall,
since there are no prots in period 2. But then no seller can make a sale at a positive price in
period 1, since the excluded seller can protably undercut. Suppose that one unit is purchased in
period 1. With two excluded sellers, the previous undercutting argument applies. Finally, if no
sales occur in period 1, then the absence of prots in period 2 implies that all sellers have a payo¤
of 0 overall. Thus, given a (2; 2) conguration, entry is never protable.
Now, consider the capacity choices of incumbent sellers. We must show that it is not protable
to add or to reduce capacity. Let i denote the equilibrium prot of seller Ci when the capacity
conguration is (2; i). It is su¢ cient to analyze the addition or subtraction of one unit of capacity
(i = 1; 3). This is since i = 0 automatically has a payo¤ of 0 and as we note below, choices i  3
share a common equilibrium payo¤. We will show that 2 > 3 and 2 > 1. First, we nd 3
and compare and then we do the same with 1.
Consider (3; 2) the buyer has two sellers to choose from and up to 3 units of demand in period 1,
this generates 7 distinct subgames in period 2. Working through all the subgames, the equilibrium
payo¤s are in Table 1.
Table 2: Discounted Period 2 incremental payo¤s for (3; 2) capacity game
Period 2 (B;H;L) conguration Buyer Payo¤ Seller CH payo¤ Seller CL payo¤
(3; 3; 2) 2(V  =3)  2=3
(2; 2; 2) V + 0 0
(2; 3; 1) V  =2  =2
(1; 2; 1)  0 0
(1; 3; 0) 0  0
All of these reect pure strategy equilibria except for (3; 3; 2) and (2; 3; 1) which are mixed.
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See Figures 5C and 5D.
Moving to period 1, the buyer demand is determined by optimizing over how many units to
purchase and from whom given period 2 payo¤s and price o¤ers pi and pj . See the demand pattern
in Figure 6A.





V is given by
F2(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1  (3  )=p for p2  p  p3
2  3=p for p3  p < p2
1 for p = p2
F3(p) =
8>>>><>>>>:
1  2=p for p3  p < p2
1  2=p for p2  p = p2 +
2  2=(p ) for p2 +  p  p3
where p
2
= VV+ , p2 = V , p3 = , p3 = 2: Prot for the C2 seller is p3 and prot for the C2
seller is p
2
+ . We note that F2 has an atom at p2 and that F3 has a at region. As with the
(2; 2) conguration, verication of this equilibrium (as well as the 3 subsequent equilibria) involves
checking that prices outside of the supports are not protable relative to the equilibrium payo¤.
See Figure 6B.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (3; 2) when  < (3;2) is given by
F2(p) =
8<:
1  (3  )=p for p2  p  p3
2  3=p for p3  p  p2
F3(p) =
8<:
1  2=p for p3  p < p2















= , and p3 = 2: Prot for the C2 seller is p3 and
prot for the C2 seller is p2 +. See Figure 6C.
To verify that a C2 seller has no incentive to add capacity, we compare prot in the (2; 2)
conguration with the prot of a C3 in the (3; 2) conguration. It is immediate that  < (3;2).
This implies that there are 3 cases to consider when comparing prots. The result then follows
immediately by routine calculations.
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Now, consider the (2; 1) conguration. The buyer has two sellers to choose from and up to 3
units of demand in period 2. Working through all the subgames, the equilibrium payo¤s are in
Table 3.
Table 3: Discounted Period 2 incremental payo¤s for (2; 1) capacity game
Period 2 (B;H;L) conguration Buyer Payo¤ Seller CH payo¤ Seller CL payo¤
(3; 2; 1) and V3  V=2 V   2 
(3; 2; 1) and V3 < V=2 V=2 V V=2
(2; 1; 1) V    
(2; 2; 0) and V3  V=2 V   2 0
(2; 2; 0) and V3 < V=2 0 V 0
(1; 1; 0) 0  0
All of these reect pure strategy equilibria except for (3; 2; 1) when V3 < V=2 which is mixed
(see Figure 5E).
Moving to period 1, the buyer demand is determined by optimizing over how many units to
purchase and from whom given period 2 payo¤s and price o¤ers pi and pj . Demand can be seen in
Figures 7A and 7B for each of the V3 cases.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (2; 1) when   (2;1)  V=2 is given by
F1(p) =
n
2  Vp  for p  p  p
F2(p) =
(
1  V2(p ) for p  p < p
1 for p = p
where p = V2 +, and p = V +: We note that there is an atom at p for F2. The prots for
the C1 seller are p and for the C2 seller they are 2p.
The mixed strategy equilibrium for (2; 1) when  < (2;1) is given by
F1(p) =
8<:
2  (2   2)=(p ) for p  p < p
1 for p = p
F2(p) =
8<:
1  (1  )=(p ) for p  p  p
1 for p = V (1 + )
where p = V (1+)+2 , and p = V +: The prots are p for the C1 seller and 2p for the C2 seller.
We observe that there are atoms at the top of both supports and that there is a gap in F2 support
below p. It is immediate that  > (2;1). This implies that there are 3 cases to consider when
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comparing prots. The result then follows immediately by routine calculations whenever   V=2.
See Figures 7A and 7B for the equilibrium supports.
There is no entry in a (2; 1) conguration. If an entrant enters and installs a unit of capacity,
then the following is an equilibrium in period 1. Each of the rms who have a unit of capacity
charge 0 and the rm with 1 unit of capacity charges , with the buyer buying both units at a
price of 0 and the seller with 2 units of capacity selling a unit in period 2 for V3. To see that this
is an equilibrium, examine seller deviations. If one of the sellers who charges 0 in the putative
equilibrium raises its price, then the buyer will buy 1 unit at a price of 0 and one unit at a price
of . This gives the buyer a higher payo¤ than buying units from the seller who deviated, since
there will be Bertrand competition between 2 sellers each trying to sell one unit in period 2. Thus,
the deviating seller does not benet. If the seller with 2 units of capacity lowers its price the buyer
will buy 1 unit from it and one from one of the sellers charging 0. Again, the price in period 2 will
be 0 due to Bertrand competition. Thus, this seller lowers his payo¤ by lowering its price. Clearly,
the seller cannot benet by raising its price above , since the buyer will still not buy from it in
period 1. Thus, we have an equilibrium and entry is not possible.
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Figure 5: Legend
Capacity (2, 2) Subgames:
Figure 5A: (B, CH, CL) = (2, 2, 1)
Figure 5B: (B, CH, CL) = (3,2,2)
Capacity (3, 2) Subgames:
Figure 5C: (B, CH, CL) = (2, 3, 1)
Figure 5D: (B, CH, CL) = (3, 3, 2)
Capacity (2, 1) subgame:
Figure 5E: (B, CH, CL) = (3, 2, 1)
 





   
